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Summary 
A dwelling constitutes the most invaluable part of a family’s welfare. Lack of a home reveals the finan-
cial vulnerability of families and is a major cause of the population’s massive external migration. Re-
public of Moldova has the lowest per capita housing space in the region. This can be explained by lim-
ited access of the population to mortgage loans. Over the past few years this deficiency has been con-
cealed by an energetic growth of remittances-fueled demand for housing. Given the global economic 
crisis that seriously hit constructions market, it became obvious that the recovery and sustainable devel-
opment of the sector would only be possible when a mortgage lending mechanism is in place. The latter 
would compensate foreign sources fueling demand for residential housing with local ones. This analysis 
reviews the experience of other countries in the region and the measures taken to relaunch the construc-
tions sector, setting, as example European practices of stimulating mortgage lending that could be 
adapted to the current situation in the Republic of Moldova.  
The constructions sector and the impact of the three overlapped crises  
The constructions market, along with the financial-banking sector and industry were the mostly affected 
by the global economic crisis. According to National Bureau of Statistics data, by the end of 2009 the 
volume of services provided by construction companies decreased by 30.6% against 2008, and the gross 
value added diminished by 27.6%. This has consequently mirrored on the overall economic situation in 
the Republic of Moldova, the constructions sector contributing with -1.4 p.p. to the Gross Domestic 
Product decline in 2009. Literally speaking, these figures were determined by the lack of liquidities, fro-
zen housing projects, individuals unable to either get their legally owned apartments or be reimbursed 
for the down payments made, workers dismissed or sent on temporary leave etc. Therefore, the recession 
in the constructions sector has both economic repercussions, given the high involvement with other eco-
nomic fields, and social implications reflected in dismissals or the inability to provide houses to the per-
sons who’ve already paid for their prospective homes. The sector has thus become victim of three over-
lapped and interdependent crises.  
 
1. Systemic crisis – core of the constructions sector’s recession. The current situation in the construc-
tions sector has not only been determined by the effects of the economic crisis, such as the decrease in 
remittances, and compression of demand for housing. At the beginning of 2008, id est a little before the 
start of the global economic crisis, the volume of works in the constructions sector started a downward 
trend. Thus, by the end of the first quarter of 2008 construction companies reduced their activity by 
10%, as against the previous year, at a moment when demand did not show signs of decreasing, a proof 
of which was a steady price growth until the fall of 2008. This first recession in the constructions sector 
can be explained by a number of deficiencies, including:  
 
• Inefficiency. Starting with the early transition years, up to 2006 the constructions sector generally 
registered the lowest labor productivity indices, as compared with other sectors of the national econ-
omy [1] . Over the past few years the situation changed, given a stagnation of the industry index, 
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regress in agriculture, as well as the real estate boom in 2005-2006, when a record number of resi-
dential projects were finalized (about 60 [2]). However, the current condition of a major part of 
companies within the sector speaks of inefficiency, in terms of inner administration and assets’ man-
agement.  
• Bureaucracy. The load of red tape procedures for obtaining construction licenses has always been a 
serious impediment for the development of an efficient entrepreneurial activity in the sector. The 
respective problem has been reflected in the World Bank report „Doing Business 2010”, Republic of 
Moldova ranking 161st among 183 rated countries, in terms of construction permits [3].  
• Lack of an attractive mortgage offer. The low trust level in the banking sector undermined the com-
mercial banks’ ability to provide long-term mortgage products with attractive interest rates. These 
loans’ share in the overall lending portfolio of the banking system fluctuated from 2% to 4 %, being 
even lower in 2009.  
• Ineffective regulatory framework [4]. The tedious enforcement of court rulings, a “deceased” land 
market, ambiguities related to assessment of the housing market value have all had a negative im-
pact on the population’s access to mortgage loans and fueled commercial banks’ reticence to provide 
long-term loans. At the same time, mortgage law came into force in 2008 only, pointing to the fact 
that the rules of the game were unclear until then. Currently, the sector faces problems relating to the 
implementation of the legislation, especially with regard to enforcement of court rulings.  
 
2. The liquidity crisis – result of defective assets’ management. A great number of companies -
developers financed real estate projects based on a financial pyramid model: initial down payments 
made by prospective tenants were used for new housing projects. Obviously, such deals can endure as 
long as there are „warm” relationships with the banking system, able to cover the liquidity deficit. Once 
banks adopted more cautious lending policies, as well as unveiled such „non-orthodox” schemes of us-
ing people’s money, the constructions market found itself „thrown” into a liquidity crisis. Finally, this 
led to freezing a number of real estate projects and 
generated major problems with the solvency of many 
housing companies, difficulties in contracting loans, 
individuals reclaiming down-payments etc.  
3. A crisis of confidence – major challenge facing 
the constructions sector recovery. The insolvency 
of many construction companies seriously damaged 
their image both with potential lenders, much more 
cautious when financing housing projects, and the 
population, skeptic and prudent in this regard.  
Thus, the global financial crisis, the symptoms of 
which were felt in the fall of 2008 has only enhanced 
the existent system deficiencies within the sector. 
These had been shadowed by an impetus given by 
remittances that directly impacted demand for resi-
dential housing, and indirectly strengthened the de-
mand for other immovable property by fueling ag-
gregated demand in the economy.  
European countries’ reaction to the effects of 
the crisis in constructions  
The global financial crisis has seriously impacted the constructions sector in many European countries. 
There are two types of measures to recover the sector: 1) direct demand stimulation by means of expan-
sionist monetary and budget-fiscal policies; and 2) stimulating the offer by implementing structural re-
forms in the sector. Most European states focused more on the first category, given the access to Euro-
pean structural funds, lower cost of the borrowed capital or simply „deepen pockets”, public funds could 
be taken from. It is worth mentioning that the decline in the constructions sector, especially in Western 
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European countries, was caused by the demand shock rather than by systemic problems specific to East-
ern European states, as is the case of the Republic of Moldova. Table 1 shows the most significant meas-
ures taken by a number of European countries targeting the recovery of the constructions sector, and the 
approximate inherent costs. The red line to be drawn, based on the data analysis is that the „salvation” of 
the constructions sector is very costly. Therefore, Moldova should focus on measures aimed at maximiz-
ing the chances to succeed. 
 
Table 1: Actions taken by European states for the recovery of the constructions sector  
Source: Review of sector-specific stimulus packages and policy responses to the global economic crisis, Interna-
tional Labor Organization, 2009 
Major challenges facing mortgage lending furthering in the Republic of Moldova 
The main barrier impeding the recovery of the constructions sector relates to individuals’ low level of 
accessibility to housing, determined by the lack of relatively attractive mechanisms of mortgage lending. 
Table 2 provides general data on up-to-date mortgage offer on the Moldovan market. Note, that the ma-
turity of such loans varies from 7 to 15 years, interest rates range from 10% to 20%, with the monthly 
interest rate on a loan worth EURO 50.000 amounting to EURO 800-1000. Taking into account the fact 
that the maximum indebtedness allowed by most financial companies constitutes 50%, the inherent in-
terest rates on mortgage loans can be paid only by households with monthly incomes of at least MDL 
29–30 thousand. Given the situation, when the average monthly wage in the economy at the beginning 
of 2010 was MDL 2699.5, any other comments on the accessibility of mortgage loans in the Republic of 
Moldova are useless.   
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Country Measure Cost 
Cyprus Accessible mortgage lending program for young families; 
school buildings’ repair program. 
EURO 250 million 
France 1) Infrastructure programs (roads, highways and hospi-
tals); expenditures’ enhancement for research, the under-
graduate education system, national security and defense. 
2) Public companies launched programs for railway, en-
ergy sector and post infrastructure modernization. 
3) Support of municipal and local infrastructure projects. 
EURO 25.9 billion 
Germany Financial backing for buildings’ modernization, aimed at 
ensuring energy efficiency and allotment of funds for in-
frastructure projects (schools and roads). 
unknown 
Italy The Government launched a 3-year fiscal stimulation pro-
gram. It includes expenses for infrastructure: construction 
of a bridge linking the peninsula with Sicily island, mod-
ernization of railway and public transportation infrastruc-
ture, highways, school buildings and projects for renew-
able energy. 
EURO 80 billion 
Holland Programs for financing roads, modernization of school 
and hospital buildings, construction of new sites. At the 
same time, with a view to removing red tape barriers, the 
procedure of granting construction permits and certifica-
tion was significantly simplified. 
unknown 
Spain The Government worked out the „E Plan” for the recovery 
of the constructions sector, aimed at creating about 
300.000 new jobs through the Fund for local entities and 
the Employment and economic recovery fund. The pro-
gram also provides for developing around 996.000 indi-
vidual housing and infrastructure projects over a 4-year 
timeframe. 
EURO 11 billion 
Great Britain Capital investment program for 2010-2011, focused on 
transportation, school buildings, housing, digital technolo-
gies. 
EURO 20 billion 
Why are mortgage loans so expensive in the Republic of Moldova? 
The relatively high interest rate on mortgage lending in the Republic of Moldova can be explained by 
the low mutual trust level between the population and the banking system. The latter is caused by a se-
ries of factors specific to transition economies, including: macroeconomic instability and increased un-
certainty regarding economic prospects. A thorough analysis of the reasons leading to expensive mort-
gage loans points to: 
1) The cost of the capital attracted by commercial banks. Though lately one can note a decrease of rates 
on deposits attracted by commercial banks, up until recently, including the first half of 2009, these 
ranged within the limits of 18%-20% for loans in MDL and 10%-11% - in foreign currency. Taking 
into account the 3-4% commercial interest usually applied by the banks, interest rates on all loans, 
mortgage ones included, became very high.  
2) Inflationary pressures. Over the past few years, except for 2009, Republic of Moldova has always 
been registering a two-digit inflation, which impacted nominal rates on deposits and, respectively loans.  
3) Insufficiency of „long money”. The low confidence in the banking sector determined the fact that 
most deposits, both in MDL and foreign currency can be made for no more than one year. At the begin-
ning of 2010, only 7.1% in total deposits in MDL were available for a one plus year-term, and 5.1% - in 
total deposits were in foreign currency. Therefore, these resources cannot be converted into long-term 
loans and when commercial banks resort to financing such projects, they charge increased risk pre-
mium included in commercial rates, taking into consideration risks generated by eventual withdrawals.  
4) Heightened uncertainties regarding the prospects of national currency evolution and inflation. Re-
public of Moldova is a country with a small and open economy, its low competitiveness making it even 
more fragile to inside and outside shocks. This fact has always fueled commercial banks’ self-restraint 
to provide long-term loans, so that most of the times their interest rates included increased risk premi-
ums.  
 
Table 2: Moldovan market mortgage offer in 2010 [5]  
 
Source: Financial institutions’ websites and author’s calculations  
Mortgage lending limited accessibility to the population is a major impediment for the recovery and 
Financial institution Maximum loan 
value 
Maximum 
loan term 
Annual rate 
[6]  
Monthly rate on a 
EUR50.000 loan con-
tracted for a maximum 
period 
EURO 830 
 (equivalent in MDL) 
B.C. „Moldova Agroindbank” 
S.A. 
MDL 500.000 7 years 9.68% MDL 8.252 
(for a loan of MDL 
500.000) 
EURO 875 
(equivalent in MDL) 
Prime Capital USD 250.000 10 years The interest 
rate decreases 
from 15% in 
the first year to 
10% in the last 
one 
from USD 833 to USD 
667 (depending on the rate 
reduction grating) 
(for a loan of USD 
50.000) 
BC „Mobiasbancă” S.A. max. 70% of the 
project cost 
10 years 18% EURO 901 
(equivalent in MDL) 
BC „Banca Socială” S.A. EUR 80.000; 
50% of the pro-
ject cost 
9 years 11.8%+1.035% 
(EURIBOR 
SEMIAN-
NUAL) 
EURO 790 
(equivalent in MDL) 
BC „Victoriabank” S.A. 70% of the pro-
ject cost 
15 years 18% 
B.C. „Banca de Economii” S.A. 70% of the pro-
ject cost 
7 years 17% EURO 1041 
(equivalent in MDL) 
B.C. "EuroCreditBank" S.A. ≥150% of the 
deposit value 
10 years 16% EURO 875 
(equivalent in MDL) 
B.C. „Banca Comercială 
Română Chişinău S.A” 
MDL 1.000.000 15 years 20% 
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further development of the constructions sector. In the past years, this deficiency has been concealed by 
a robust increase of demand for housing, fueled by remittances, while viable domestic mechanisms to 
stimulate demand for real estate were practically inexistent. Consequently, per capita housing in the Re-
public of Moldova is one of the lowest in Europe (Diagram 1). This clearly reveals the problems related 
to the population’s access to housing, and, on the other hand shows the huge potential of the real estate 
market in the country.  
Diagram 1: Per capita housing, m2, 2008 
 
Source: National Bureaus of Statistics of the respective states  
What are the solutions? 
The shortage of „long and cheap money” vital for mortgage lending is a common problem for most tran-
sition economies. Therefore, this issue has been addressed by the governments of several states in the 
region, which came with a number of solutions allowing greater access to mortgage loans. The most suc-
cessful are synthesized below.  
1. Individual accumulation plans 
This mechanism stimulates the population to make longer-term savings (for ex. 3-5 years), being re-
warded with possibilities to obtain mortgage loans for terms and with interest rates below the market 
average. This concept was implemented in Germany and Austria („Bausparkaasen” system), France 
(„Credit differe” system), Great Britain and Ireland („Building societies” system). Noting that the re-
spective system aims at ensuring mortgage loans’ accessibility to families with low or medium incomes, 
the concept has been taken over by several Central and Eastern European states (Czech Republic, Slova-
kia, Hungary, Croatia, Ukraine etc.). The system also solves another fundamental problem, specific to 
most transition countries: the low trust level in the banking sector and the shortage of „long and cheap 
money” administered by commercial banks.  
 
Figure 1: Functioning of individual accumulation plans  
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Diagram 1 shows that individual accumulation schemes function like mortgage lending mechanisms on 
the account of prospective tenants. Thus, an individual planning on applying for a mortgage loan on 
relatively attractive terms has to sign an accumulation contract, pledging to make at determined periods 
of time (3-5 years) deposits (monthly or quarterly), accumulated in a term deposits’ fund, provided that 
upon contract expiry he/she is to receive a mortgage loan worth 120%-130% of the deposit value. Obvi-
ously, the inherent interest rate is lower than the market average. The bank has to provide a mortgage 
loan upon deposit maturity and have the opportunity to provide loans at attractive rates. At the same 
time, commercial banks succeed in attracting long-term reserves, which positively tell on mortgage lend-
ing. According to preliminary calculations, if applied in the Republic of Moldova, this system could al-
low a three-fold decrease in the monthly rates on mortgage loans, taking into account the reduction in 
interest rates and significant increase (about two-fold) of the maximum loan life. Eventually, this mecha-
nism can complement other mortgage lending instruments, further analyzed.  
2. Issuance of mortgage bonds 
In several European states (Germany, Denmark, Austria, France, Spain, Luxemburg) mortgage loans’ 
financing is made on the account of issuance by specialized institutions (mortgage banks) of mortgage 
bonds. Thus, mortgage products are not based on deposits made by the population, as per classical prin-
ciple of commercial banks’ functioning, but rely on private pension funds or other private investors, in-
cluding foreign ones, who buy mortgage bonds with relatively long maturity terms (ex. 5-10 years). The 
European Union legislation strictly regulates the process by means of restrictions aimed at avoiding the 
“bubble” effect, like the US one over the past decades. Thus, the mortgage loans’ volume cannot exceed 
the volume of issued bonds, inherent interest rates must be at least at the level of the respective coupons, 
specialized institutions insure loans, and the default procedure is clearly stipulated. This system is very 
well protected from eventual financial and economic turbulence, the banks and the population having 
access to „cheap and long money”.  
Figure 2: The mechanism of mortgage banks’ functioning  
Obviously such a practice can only be gradually implemented in the Republic of Moldova, taking into 
account the scarcity of liquidities on the capital market, the macroeconomic instability (especially in 
terms of inflation) and the low trust level in financial institutions. However, the respective tool can be 
complemented by other mortgage products, in such a way that mortgage bonds could finance 30%-40% 
of the mortgage loan on the market. This leads to another question: „Who would be willing to purchase 
mortgage bonds with long maturity terms?” The answer is: private pension funds, based on accumula-
tion principles, as is the case of most European states. This will make available sufficient long-term li-
quidities to be used for financing mortgage loans. An estimate shows that a gradual implementation of 
such a reform, provided that the share of deposits redistributed from the pensions’ system gradually in-
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creases by 3% to 7% yearly, would generate liquidities amounting to MDL 450 million in the first year, 
part of which (approx. 60%) could be used for mortgage loans’ financing [7] .  
3. Taking over the default risk by a third party (for ex.: „Prima Casă”, insurance companies, spe-
cialized funds, etc.) 
Commercial banks’ skepticism regarding the economic prospects of the population has always fueled 
debtor’s default risk managed by banks, especially what regards mortgage loans. Therefore, the risk pre-
miums included in the loans’ commercial rate have always been relatively high, which was and still is a 
major impediment for loans’ reduction. But, the biggest problem does not refer to these risk premiums, 
which function is obvious in any transition state, but to the way the risk is being managed. Currently, the 
mortgage default risk in the Republic of Moldova is administered directly by banks, which means that the 
risk is not capitalized and managed by a specialized institution (such as an insurance company, special-
ized fund, etc.). This explains why risk premiums are relatively high and the banks are cautious in provid-
ing mortgage loans. A number of states all over the world resorted to transmitting the default risk to third 
parties (specialized companies, private or public).  
 
Table 3: Mortgage default insurance worldwide  
 
Source: Establishing Mortgage Guarantee Insurance in Transition and Emerging Markets, The Urban Institute, 
2003 
The principle of mortgage guarantee insurance is the following: the financial institution providing the 
loan receives a guarantee from the insurance company, worth the equivalent of the covered risk, accord-
ing to which, in case of debtor’s insolvency, the bank can redeem the value of the loan according to the 
respective risk share.  
The functioning principle of insurance companies in various countries differs. Some practice classical risk 
insurance, the banks resorting to either private insurance companies, or specialized institutions, paying 
annual premiums against default risk managed by the insurance firm. In other countries default risk is 
being covered by specialized mortgage guarantee funds, made of public money. A good example is the 
program „Prima Casă” (First House), recently launched in Romania, guaranteeing 80% of the mortgage 
loan value. The biggest difference between the two principles lays in the fact that private insurance com-
panies cover, most of the times, a smaller share of the loans’ value (20%-40%), while public institutions 
vouch for 80%-100%. At the same time, rates on loans insured by private companies are higher than the 
Country Property type Loan coverage 
United States of America Public and private Public: 100% 
Private: 20%-30% 
Canada Public and private Public: 100% 
Private: <100% 
Australia Private 100% or less 
New Zeeland Private 20%-30% 
Great Britain Private <100% 
France Public 100% 
Italy Private 20%-40% 
Spain Private 20%-40% 
Holland Public 100% 
Sweden Public <100% 
Lithuania Public 100% 
Kazakhstan Public 30% 
Latvia Public 22% 
Romania Public 80% 
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ones guaranteed by the state, because of the insurance premium paid by the banks and included in the 
loans’ commercial rate.   
However, though the option for a state guarantee of the default risk seems more advantageous due to more 
attractive interest rates on mortgage loans, one should take into consideration the following aspects: 
• The risk of moral hazards from commercial banks. Given a fund to take over „free of charge” default 
risk, commercial banks credit persons who can fail, at a certain moment, to reimburse the loan. In this 
case, the loan is being reimbursed from public money. The situation is worse when the state assumes 
responsibility to guaranteeing the total loan value.  
• The risk of toxic assets to be covered from budgetary sources. Covering such losses from public money 
will lead to preserving losses within the system, so that the banks will be more and more compelled to 
credit individuals with low incomes, against a state guarantee, and the losses will consequently hit the 
public budget.  
• The need to make available public means. Most of the times, state guarantees involve the creation of 
specialized funds to be used for covering eventual losses incurred by the banks. The respective funds 
are made of public money, which means that indirectly, default risks are transposed on all taxpayers, 
including lenders.  
The Moldovan government should take into account the above-mentioned aspects, when working out a 
mechanism to guarantee mortgage loans. It is worth mentioning that in Romania – country where there has 
recently been implemented the program „Prima Casă” (First house), there are already being heard voices 
pointing to the risk of soon witnessing the first bankruptcy cases. Moreover, the Romanian Government has 
not established a separate Fund for covering such expenses, using instead the National Fund to support 
small and medium-size enterprises. This is a big mistake, leading to the investments’ „crowding out”.  
Within the context of the Republic of Moldova, a viable solution would be the creation of public-private 
partnerships, which could allow default risks’ sharing between the state, insurance companies and banks at 
a ratio of 40:40:20. The state should set up a Special Fund; insurance companies could transfer part of the 
risks through re-insurance to foreign companies with greater experience in the field. This golden measure 
would allow avoiding commercial banks’ moral hazards on one hand, and diminishing mortgage loan inter-
est rates on the other hand. 
Drawing a conclusion… 
Finding viable operating mechanisms for mortgage lending, accessible to larger parts of the population 
should be one of the priorities on the Government’s agenda. The recently launched initiative regarding the 
implementation of a mortgage lending stimulation program (based on the model of the Romanian “First 
House”) should be accompanied by a complex set of measures, aimed at solving a series of systemic prob-
lems, including: scarcity of long-term reserves within commercial banks; tedious enforcement of court rul-
ings in mortgage-related cases; harmonizing the regulatory framework; clearly stating each party’s respon-
sibility within the system. One has to also take into account the moral hazards prone to appear within com-
mercial banks in the case when the state guarantees mortgage loans. The solution could be to establish a 
public-private partnership with a view to guaranteeing default risks, involving insurance companies and 
simultaneously set up a special fund based on public money. It is also necessary to keep in mind the other 
mentioned mechanisms (individual accumulation schemes and mortgage bonds), also to be used as comple-
mentary tools, given the underdeveloped capital and insurance markets, the population’s limited financial 
capacity and budgetary constraints. A balanced combination of these would generate new and more attrac-
tive mortgage lending instruments, so that a greater number of Moldovan families could have the opportu-
nity to enjoy their own house’s square meters.  
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Sources: 
[1] Moldovan Economic Growth Analysis (MEGA), nr. 1, Expert-Grup. 
[2] As per Real Estate Guide 2008.  
[3] http://www.doingbusiness.org/Documents/CountryProfiles/MDA.pdf. 
[4] Mortgage Law no. 142 as of 26.06.2008. 
[5] The results of the calculations are approximate and do not include the relevant fees charged by 
financial institutions for providing and administering loans.  
[6] Rates can be slightly modified, depending on the borrower’s lending history.  
[7] Lupuşor Adrian, Master’s paper „The feasiblitity of implementing private pensions’ system in 
the Republic of Moldova. International experience and current social and demographic constraints”, 
2010.  
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